CVE-2026-59249
Sign-tolerant HTTP/1 chunk-size parser in Mint enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections
Weakness Type (CWE)
CWE-444 — CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
CAPEC
Vulnerability description
Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP requests (HTTP response smuggling) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on the same pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.
The Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 function in lib/mint/http1.ex parses the chunk-size line of a Transfer-Encoding: chunked response with Integer.parse(data, 16). RFC 7230 defines chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG and forbids any sign prefix, but Integer.parse/2 accepts an optional leading + or -. A chunk-size line of +5 is accepted as a five-byte chunk; lines of +0 and -0 are accepted as the terminating zero-length chunk and end the message body early.
An RFC-strict intermediary in the response path rejects these forms, so the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on where one response ends and the next begins. On a pooled keep-alive connection, an attacker-influenced origin can inject bytes that the client attributes to the next legitimate response on the same connection, poisoning the response queue and corrupting the responses returned to unrelated in-flight requests.
This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.3.
Affected
pkg:hex/mint
| Module | Source File | Routine |
|---|---|---|
Mint.HTTP1
|
lib/mint/http1.ex
|
Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5
|
pkg:github/elixir-mint/mint
| Module | Source File | Routine |
|---|---|---|
Mint.HTTP1
|
lib/mint/http1.ex
|
Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5
|
| Status | Type | Version | Changes / Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| affected | git ⓘ | 60089586ec
|
< fc7d16538d
|
Configurations
Exploitation requires a deployment topology in which an RFC-strict HTTP/1 intermediary (proxy, load balancer, or WAF) sits between the Mint client and the attacker-influenced origin, and HTTP/1 connections between the client and the intermediary are reused across requests (keep-alive with connection pooling). Mint clients that talk directly to an origin without an intermediary, or that do not reuse connections, are not exploitable for response-queue poisoning even if the vulnerable parsing behavior is present.
References
- https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/security/advisories/GHSA-x3x7-96vm-6h2w vendor-advisory related
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-59249 related
- https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/fc7d16538db7e40b56ed489f08683225cb0197fa patch
Credits
- Finder: Thepigtails
- Remediation developer: Andrea Leopardi
- Remediation reviewer: Eric Meadows-Jönsson
- Analyst: Jonatan Männchen / EEF
CVE record as JSON:
GET /cves/CVE-2026-59249.json
OSV record as JSON:
GET /osv/EEF-CVE-2026-59249.json