Only deployments that configure a static \"memo\" in the Tempo method_config are affected. Deployments using the default per-challenge attribution memo are not: that path binds each settled transfer to the challenge under verification and is single-use by construction.
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.
\nMPP.Methods.Tempo normally binds a settled TIP-20 TransferWithMemo to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static \"memo\" is configured in method_config, check_matched_memo_binding/3 returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only token, recipient, amount and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a type=\"hash\" credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4.
"},{"base64":false,"type":"text/markdown","value":"Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.\n\n`MPP.Methods.Tempo` normally binds a settled TIP-20 `TransferWithMemo` to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static `\"memo\"` is configured in `method_config`, `check_matched_memo_binding/3` returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only `token`, `recipient`, `amount` and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a `type=\"hash\"` credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4."}],"value":"Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.\n\nMPP.Methods.Tempo normally binds a settled TIP-20 TransferWithMemo to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static \"memo\" is configured in method_config, check_matched_memo_binding/3 returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only token, recipient, amount and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a type=\"hash\" credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4."}],"impacts":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-60","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-60 Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"PRESENT","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":8.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-294","description":"CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-19T17:19:52.413Z","orgId":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db","shortName":"EEF"},"references":[{"tags":["vendor-advisory","related"],"url":"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-34g7-vx6g-82mq"},{"tags":["related"],"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73136.html"},{"tags":["related"],"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73136"},{"tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/2207d7f456ae14c1d3fcacc6f635bf4f8cee1a34"}],"source":{"discovery":"EXTERNAL"},"title":"Static memo configuration in mpp Tempo disables per-challenge attribution binding, enabling third-party replay","workarounds":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"Remove the static \"memo\" from the Tempo method_config so verification falls back to the default per-challenge attribution binding, which ties each settled transfer to the challenge being verified. Where a static memo must be kept, configure a dedup store (for example MPP.Tempo.ConCacheStore) with a TTL at least as long as the challenge expiry, which reduces unlimited replay to a race on the transaction hash rather than closing it.