Reachable only when an application exposes an AshAi read tool over a resource whose field policies restrict a field that the calling actor can still name as an aggregate (for example a public? true but field-policy-protected attribute).
AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
\nThis issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3.
"},{"base64":false,"type":"text/markdown","value":"AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (`min`, `max`, `sum`, `avg`) that builds an ad-hoc `Ash.Query.Aggregate` over a named field and returns its raw value.\n\nAsh field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with `%Ash.ForbiddenField{}`), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; `min`/`max` in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are `public? true` but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.\n\nThe fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.\n\nThis issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3."}],"value":"AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.\n\nAsh field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.\n\nThe fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.\n\nThis issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3."}],"impacts":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-1","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-1 Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"PRESENT","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":6,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","privilegesRequired":"LOW","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","vulnIntegrityImpact":"NONE","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-1220","description":"CWE-1220 Insufficient Granularity of Access Control","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-08T16:41:45.975Z","orgId":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db","shortName":"EEF"},"references":[{"name":"GHSA-v5rw-36x5-r5vx","tags":["vendor-advisory"],"url":"https://github.com/ash-project/ash_ai/security/advisories/GHSA-v5rw-36x5-r5vx"},{"name":"EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-78230","tags":["related"],"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-78230.html"},{"name":"OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-78230","tags":["related"],"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-78230"},{"name":"Introducing commit 2ba234b in ash-project/ash_ai","tags":["related"],"url":"https://github.com/ash-project/ash_ai/commit/2ba234b50946a3b8116190c8467f9f4dfa5edce7"},{"name":"Fix commit 9c02de5 in ash-project/ash_ai","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/ash-project/ash_ai/commit/9c02de581625c342c9870a672830bff28c1d701e"}],"source":{"discovery":"EXTERNAL"},"title":"AshAi aggregate tool can read field-policy-protected fields"}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db","assignerShortName":"EEF","cveId":"CVE-2026-78230","datePublished":"2026-09-08T16:41:45.975Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-31T00:45:02.439Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-08T16:41:45.975Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"}