{"affected":[{"package":{"ecosystem":"Hex","name":"boruta","purl":"pkg:hex/boruta"},"ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"2.3.0"},{"fixed":"2.3.7"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"versions":["2.3.0","2.3.1","2.3.2","2.3.3","2.3.4","2.3.5","2.3.6"]},{"ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"5bfbe1c5443bffe71cf1bf954bbdff61327d9a83"},{"fixed":"5204f88f9b2cdd9637a755337ed5f99185be5474"},{"fixed":"69363432aa36760fc5438e4e17115d0f7c1b925a"}],"repo":"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth","type":"GIT"}]}],"aliases":["GHSA-xjv8-vmh5-xhf6","CVE-2026-53431"],"credits":[{"name":"Pascal Knoth","type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Pascal Knoth","type":"REMEDIATION_DEVELOPER"},{"name":"Jonatan Männchen / EEF","type":"ANALYST"}],"database_specific":{"capec_ids":["CAPEC-60"],"cpe_ids":["cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"cwe_ids":["CWE-294"]},"details":"## Summary\n\nAuthentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an attacker who has obtained a previously valid JWT client assertion to authenticate as the issuing OAuth client after the assertion has expired.\n\nBoruta accepts JWT-based client authentication (client\\_secret\\_jwt and private\\_key\\_jwt token endpoint authentication methods) but never enforces that the assertion's exp claim is in the future. The pre-check helper Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.check\\_expiration/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex only verifies that an exp claim is present (it pattern-matches on the existence of the key and returns success), and the Joken token configuration used for signature verification, Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token.token\\_config/0 in lib/boruta/oauth/authorization/client.ex, returns an empty map, so Joken's default exp claim validator is not engaged either. Any attacker who obtains a validly-signed client assertion (for example through logs, reverse proxies, browser tooling, or other observability surfaces) can replay it indefinitely to authenticate as the client and obtain access tokens with that client's privileges.\n\nThis issue affects boruta: from 2.3.0 before 2.3.7.\n\n## Workaround\n\nRestrict the use of JWT-based client authentication (client\\_secret\\_jwt and private\\_key\\_jwt) to highly trusted clients, and prefer non-JWT client authentication methods (client\\_secret\\_basic or client\\_secret\\_post) where possible. Where JWT client authentication must remain enabled, issue short-lived client assertions and protect them from exposure in application logs, fronting proxies, browser tooling, and observability systems to reduce the window for replay.\n\n## Configuration\n\nThe attack requires that the Boruta deployment has provisioned at least one OAuth client configured to authenticate via JWT client assertions (client\\_secret\\_jwt or private\\_key\\_jwt token endpoint authentication methods). Deployments that authenticate clients only via client\\_secret\\_basic or client\\_secret\\_post are not exposed.","id":"EEF-CVE-2026-53431","modified":"2026-07-30T14:17:27.909Z","published":"2026-07-30T14:17:27.909Z","references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-xjv8-vmh5-xhf6"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53431.html"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/5204f88f9b2cdd9637a755337ed5f99185be5474"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/69363432aa36760fc5438e4e17115d0f7c1b925a"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://hex.pm/packages/boruta"}],"related":[],"schema_version":"1.7.3","severity":[{"score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","type":"CVSS_V4"}],"summary":"Boruta accepts expired JWT client assertions due to missing exp claim validation","upstream":[]}