{"affected":[{"package":{"ecosystem":"Hex","name":"jose","purl":"pkg:hex/jose"},"ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"1.10.0"},{"fixed":"1.11.13"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"versions":["1.10.0","1.10.1","1.11.0","1.11.1","1.11.2","1.11.4","1.11.5","1.11.6","1.11.7","1.11.8","1.11.9","1.11.10","1.11.11","1.11.12"]},{"ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"85fddd89ee56b6f9c19eff7d9cfffeef62c330b9"},{"fixed":"461b261902531ca016190e780bb70862d561a7e0"}],"repo":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose","type":"GIT"}]}],"aliases":["GHSA-h4gx-8jq2-mfhc","CVE-2026-65629"],"credits":[{"name":"Peter Ullrich","type":"REPORTER"},{"name":"Andrew Bennett","type":"REMEDIATION_DEVELOPER"},{"name":"Jonatan Männchen / EEF","type":"ANALYST"}],"database_specific":{"capec_ids":["CAPEC-16"],"cpe_ids":["cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"cwe_ids":["CWE-916"]},"details":"## Summary\n\nUse of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack.\n\nWhen jose exports a password-encrypted private key with `jose_jwk:to_der/2` (`JOSE.JWK.to_der/2`), the `jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3` function in `src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl` serializes the key as a `PKCS#8` `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller.\n\nBoth values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nWhen exporting a password-encrypted private key with `jose_jwk:to_der/2` (`JOSE.JWK.to_der/2`), use a long, high-entropy passphrase, since the weak key-derivation work factor only meaningfully lowers the cost of cracking guessable passwords. Restrict access to exported `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` blobs and keep them out of backups, repositories, object storage, and logs that an attacker could read.","id":"EEF-CVE-2026-65629","modified":"2026-10-26T19:53:35.969597Z","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:35.646Z","references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-h4gx-8jq2-mfhc"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65629.html"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/85fddd89ee56b6f9c19eff7d9cfffeef62c330b9"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/461b261902531ca016190e780bb70862d561a7e0"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://hex.pm/packages/jose"}],"related":[],"schema_version":"1.7.3","severity":[{"score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","type":"CVSS_V4"}],"summary":"Weak PBKDF2 parameters for password-encrypted private-key export in jose","upstream":[]}