HTTP/1.1 chunked request bodies made of 1-byte chunks amplify memory use in Bandit

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the HTTP/1.1 chunked body reader of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory and CPU via a request body made of many 1-byte chunks.

The chunked reader in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex keeps every chunk as its own list cell and binary term until IO.iodata_to_binary/1 joins them, and nothing limits the number of chunks. The :length option of read_body/2 counts only data bytes, so tiny chunks cost far more memory than their payload: 48 MB of 1-byte chunks grew one handler process to about 500 MB and took about 6 s of CPU. The route does not need to read the body, because on keep-alive connections ensure_completed/1 drains unread bodies through the same reader.

This issue affects bandit: from 0.1.0 before 1.14.0.

1. Per-chunk accumulation. do_read_chunked_data! in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex collects chunks as [body | chunk], adding a cons cell and a binary term for every chunk.

2. Byte-only limit. :length limits data bytes, not the number of chunks, so a body of 1\r\nx\r\n chunks becomes an 8-million-element improper list before IO.iodata_to_binary runs. Sending 48 MB of 1-byte chunks grew the handler heap to about 500 MB and used about 6 s of CPU. The same body as one 8 MB chunk peaked at about 16 MB and took 5 ms.

3. No body read needed. On keep-alive connections, ensure_completed/1 drains unread bodies through the same path. Against a Plug that never calls read_body, the attack used about 417 MB.

1. Run Bandit with a Plug that calls Plug.Conn.read_body(conn, length: 1_000_000, read_length: 1_000_000).
2. Send POST / with Transfer-Encoding: chunked and a body of 1,000,000 chunks of 1\r\nA\r\n, followed by 0\r\n\r\n.
3. When read_body returns the 1,000,000 body bytes, the handler process holds about 48 MB and BEAM memory has grown by about 55 MB, for 6 MB sent.

From 0.7.0, a server whose clients and proxies all speak HTTP/2 can disable HTTP/1 with http_1_options: [enabled: false], so that the vulnerable chunked body reader never runs.