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Description
esaml parses attacker-controlled SAML messages using xmerl_scan:string/2 before signature verification without disabling XML entity expansion. On Erlang/OTP versions before 27, Xmerl allows entities by default, enabling pre-signature XXE attacks. An attacker can cause the host to read local files (e.g., Kubernetes-mounted secrets) into the SAML document. If the attacker is not a trusted SAML SP, signature verification will fail and the document is discarded, but file contents may still be exposed through logs or error messages.
This issue affects all versions of esaml, including forks by arekinath, handnot2, and dropbox. Users running on Erlang/OTP 27 or later are not affected due to Xmerl defaulting to entities disabled.
Weaknesses & attack patterns
Weakness
CWE-611
·
Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference
in catalog →
MITRE ↗
Attack patterns
CAPEC-201
·
Serialized Data External Linking
MITRE ↗
Affected — Hex / esaml Hex.pm ↗
All versions affected.
Affected — GitHub / arekinath/esaml Repository ↗
All versions affected.
Affected — GitHub / handnot2/esaml Repository ↗
All versions affected.
Affected — GitHub / dropbox/esaml Repository ↗
All versions affected.
Affected — GitHub / jump-app/esaml Repository ↗
Workarounds
Configurations
References
Credits
CVSS breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N