Am I affected?
Description
Symlink following vulnerability in Gleam's Hex package export allows files outside the project root to be embedded in the generated package tarball.
The file collection helpers (gleam_files, native_files, private_files) in compiler-cli/src/fs.rs use follow_links(true) when walking publishable directories such as src/ and priv/. The collected paths are added to the package archive via add_path_to_tar in compiler-cli/src/publish.rs without verifying that the resolved target remains within the project root. A symlink placed under a publishable directory will cause gleam export hex-tarball or gleam publish to embed the contents of the symlink target into the generated Hex package.
An attacker with write access to the project repository can place a symlink in src/ or priv/ pointing to an arbitrary file. When a maintainer or CI pipeline runs gleam publish or gleam export hex-tarball, local files readable by the publisher (such as secrets, tokens, or SSH keys) are silently embedded into the published package artifact.
This issue affects Gleam from 0.10.0-rc1 until 1.17.0.
Weaknesses & attack patterns
Weakness
CWE-59
·
Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
in catalog →
MITRE ↗
Attack patterns
CAPEC-132
·
Symlink Attack
MITRE ↗
Affected — Gleam
modules · source files · routines
Affected — GitHub / gleam-lang/gleam Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Affected — ghcr.io / gleam-lang/gleam Container registry ↗
modules · source files · routines
Workarounds
- Avoid running gleam publish or gleam export hex-tarball on untrusted projects
- Review the contents of src/ and priv/ for unexpected symlinks before publishing
- Run publishing commands in a restricted or isolated environment (e.g. containers)
References
GHSA-qhh5-fg4c-8gqc ↗
vendor-advisory
EEF-CVE-2026-42795 ↗
related
Credits
CVSS breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N