CVE-2026-49755
Decompression bomb DoS in Req via auto-decoded archive and compressed response bodies
Weakness Type (CWE)
CWE-409 — CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
CAPEC
Vulnerability description
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies.Req's default response pipeline includes 'Elixir.Req.Steps':decode_body/1 and 'Elixir.Req.Steps':decompress_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decode_body/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and calls :zip.extract(body, [:memory]) for application/zip, :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]) for application/x-tar, and :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]) for application/gzip / .tgz. Each returns the full decompressed archive contents as a [{name, bytes}] list in memory, with no per-entry or total size cap. decompress_body/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib/:brotli/:ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip inflates through multiple layers without bound.
Both steps are enabled by default, no caller opt-in is required, and the attacker controls the content-type and content-encoding headers on their own server (or on any host reached via Req's automatic redirect following). A sub-megabyte response can expand to multiple gigabytes on the victim, crashing the BEAM process.
This issue affects req: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.1.
Affected
pkg:hex/req
| Module | Source File | Routine |
|---|---|---|
Req.Steps
|
lib/req/steps.ex
|
Req.Steps.decode_body/1
|
Req.Steps.decompress_body/1
|
pkg:github/wojtekmach/req
| Module | Source File | Routine |
|---|---|---|
Req.Steps
|
lib/req/steps.ex
|
Req.Steps.decode_body/1
|
Req.Steps.decompress_body/1
|
| Status | Type | Version | Changes / Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| affected | git ⓘ | e37753741c
|
< 84977e5b1a
|
Workarounds
Disable Req's automatic body decoding on requests that fetch attacker-influenced URLs by passing decode_body: false to 'Elixir.Req':new/1 / 'Elixir.Req':get!/1. To also skip the content-encoding decompression pipeline, pass raw: true. Both options leave the response body as the raw on-the-wire bytes, so the caller can size-check before any decompression.
References
- https://github.com/wojtekmach/req/security/advisories/GHSA-655f-mp8p-96gv vendor-advisory related
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-49755 related
- https://github.com/wojtekmach/req/commit/84977e5b1a83f26e749d55ad06e3625464af4e8d patch
Credits
- Finder: Peter Ullrich
- Remediation developer: Wojtek Mach
- Analyst: Jonatan Männchen / EEF
CVE record as JSON:
GET /cves/CVE-2026-49755.json
OSV record as JSON:
GET /osv/EEF-CVE-2026-49755.json