Boruta accepts expired JWT client assertions due to missing exp claim validation

Weakness Type (CWE)

CWE-294 — CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay

CAPEC

CAPEC-60 — CAPEC-60 Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)

CVSS 4.0 Score

9.1

CRITICAL

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Vulnerability description

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an attacker who has obtained a previously valid JWT client assertion to authenticate as the issuing OAuth client after the assertion has expired.

Boruta accepts JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt token endpoint authentication methods) but never enforces that the assertion's exp claim is in the future. The pre-check helper 'Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base':check_expiration/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex only verifies that an exp claim is present (it pattern-matches on the existence of the key and returns success), and the Joken token configuration used for signature verification, 'Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token':token_config/0 in lib/boruta/oauth/authorization/client.ex, returns an empty map, so Joken's default exp claim validator is not engaged either. Any attacker who obtains a validly-signed client assertion (for example through logs, reverse proxies, browser tooling, or other observability surfaces) can replay it indefinitely to authenticate as the client and obtain access tokens with that client's privileges.

This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.0 before 2.3.7.

Affected

`pkg:hex/boruta`

Module	Source File	Routine
`Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base`	`lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex`	`Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_client_authentication/1`
`Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token`	`lib/boruta/oauth/authorization/client.ex`	`Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.check_expiration/1`
		`Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token.token_config/0`

Status	Type	Version	Changes / Fixed in
affected	semver ^ⓘ	`2.3.0`	< `2.3.7`

`pkg:github/malach-it/boruta_auth`

Module	Source File	Routine
`Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base`	`lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex`	`Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_client_authentication/1`
`Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token`	`lib/boruta/oauth/authorization/client.ex`	`Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.check_expiration/1`
		`Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token.token_config/0`

Status	Type	Version	Changes / Fixed in
affected	git ^ⓘ	`5bfbe1c544`	unaffected at `5204f88f9b` unaffected at `69363432aa`

Configurations

The attack requires that the Boruta deployment has provisioned at least one OAuth client configured to authenticate via JWT client assertions (client_secret_jwt or private_key_jwt token endpoint authentication methods). Deployments that authenticate clients only via client_secret_basic or client_secret_post are not exposed.

Workarounds

Restrict the use of JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt) to highly trusted clients, and prefer non-JWT client authentication methods (client_secret_basic or client_secret_post) where possible. Where JWT client authentication must remain enabled, issue short-lived client assertions and protect them from exposure in application logs, fronting proxies, browser tooling, and observability systems to reduce the window for replay.

References

Credits

Finder: Pascal Knoth
Remediation developer: Pascal Knoth
Analyst: Jonatan Männchen / EEF

CVE record as JSON: GET /cves/CVE-2026-53431.json
OSV record as JSON: GET /osv/EEF-CVE-2026-53431.json