EEx template evaluation of prompt content in AshAi enables remote code execution

Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection) vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a remote, unauthenticated client to execute arbitrary Elixir code.

AshAi.Actions.Prompt evaluates prompt content through EEx.eval_string/2. The documented prompt: fn input, context -> ... end form lets the prompt content be built from action arguments, so when a prompt action's text incorporates request data, that attacker-controlled text is compiled and run as an EEx template (Elixir source). Content such as <%= System.cmd(...) %> therefore executes on the server before any model request is made, requiring no authentication beyond reaching a prompt action. The fix stops evaluating function-supplied prompt content as EEx; only statically configured templates are evaluated.

This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.0.