Terminal escape sequence injection in the mix igniter.install confirmation prompt via package metadata

Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences vulnerability in ash-project igniter allows a malicious package publisher to forge the mix igniter.install confirmation prompt.

mix igniter.install prints a confirmation panel (an anti-typosquatting safeguard) listing a package's hex metadata before adding it. The panel builder in Igniter.Project.Deps wrote publisher-controlled fields (meta.description, owner usernames, requirement names, version) to the terminal with only newlines stripped. A malicious or typosquatted package can embed ANSI terminal escape sequences (cursor movement, line erase, carriage returns) in its metadata to overwrite the panel, forging trusted author names and download counts while concealing the real ones, so a developer relying on the panel to vet the package is deceived into approving a malicious dependency.

This issue affects igniter: from 0.8.1 before 0.8.4.

Reachable only when a developer runs mix igniter.install against an untrusted or misspelled package name in a terminal emulator that interprets ANSI escape sequences.