ash_authentication_oauth2_server aliases every protocol endpoint under /.well-known, bypassing path-scoped controls

Improper Protection of Alternate Path vulnerability in ash-project ash_authentication_oauth2_server exposes the state-changing OAuth endpoints under an unintended URL prefix, bypassing controls scoped to the canonical prefix.

oauth2_server_protocol_routes/1 in AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Oauth2Server.Router forwards the same ProtocolRouter at both the /oauth prefix and the /.well-known prefix. Phoenix forward strips the matched prefix before dispatch, so the full route table answers under both mounts, and POST /register, POST /token, and POST /revoke are reachable as /.well-known/register, /.well-known/token, and /.well-known/revoke. Edge controls such as WAF rules, rate limits, or authentication exemptions written against the /oauth paths, or that allow-list /.well-known as unauthenticated, do not apply to the alias.

This issue affects ash_authentication_oauth2_server: from 0.1.0 before 0.3.1.

The routing alias is unconditional. Exploitable impact depends on the deployment applying path-scoped edge controls (WAF, rate limiting, auth-redirect exemptions) to the /oauth prefix, or allow-listing /.well-known as unauthenticated, that the alias then bypasses.