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Description

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in benoitc idna allows an attacker who controls a hostname passed to the library to exhaust CPU via an over-long xn-- label. idna:ulabel/1 in src/idna.erl hands every ASCII label that starts with xn-- to punycode:decode/1 without applying check_label_length/1, the 63-octet DNS label limit. punycode:decode/1 in src/punycode.erl builds its output with list appends in insert/4, so its cost grows super-linearly with the label length. A label of a few kilobytes keeps a scheduler busy for seconds to minutes before the label is rejected as invalid punycode.

Every decode entry point reaches this path: decode/1, decode/2, to_unicode/1 and from_ascii/1. The encode path reaches it as well, because alabel/1 calls ulabel/1 on an ASCII xn-- label before its own length check, so encode/1, encode/2 and to_ascii/1 are affected for such input.

This issue affects idna: from 0.5.0 before 8.0.0.

Technical analysis

1. Label dispatch. idna:decode/2 in src/idna.erl lowercases the domain, splits it into labels and passes each one to ulabel/1. For an all-ASCII label that starts with xn--, ulabel/1 strips the prefix and calls punycode:decode/1 on the remainder. No length check runs before that call. check_label_length/1, which rejects labels longer than 63 octets, is only called from alabel/1, and there only after alabel/1 has itself called ulabel/1 on an ASCII label.

2. Super-linear decoding. punycode:decode/1 in src/punycode.erl decodes one code point per delta and places it into the output with insert/4. insert/4 walks to the insertion index by rebuilding the head with Head ++ [C] on every step and then appends the tail with another ++. Each insertion therefore costs time quadratic in the insertion index, and the total work grows roughly with the cube of the label length. The reporter measured about an 8x increase in running time per doubling of the label.

3. Work before rejection. The crafted label is not valid punycode and the call eventually exits with an error, but only after the decoder has processed the whole label. The ?MAX overflow guards in punycode:decode/1 cover the RFC 3492 integer overflow class and do not bound the running time.

4. Entry points. decode/1, decode/2, to_unicode/1 and from_ascii/1 reach ulabel/1 in every affected release. From 6.0.0, alabel/1 calls ulabel/1 on any ASCII label that starts with xn-- before check_label_length/1, so encode/1, encode/2, to_ascii/1 and utf8_to_ascii/1 reach the decoder for such input as well.

Proof of concept

  1. Build an ASCII domain whose label is xn-- followed by several thousand a characters and the digits 99.
  2. Call idna:decode/1 on it and measure the call with timer:tc/1.
  3. The call exits with an invalid punycode error only after the decoder has processed the whole label. The reporter measured on OTP 27: 506 bytes in 72 ms, 1006 bytes in 494 ms, 2006 bytes in 3.3 s and 4006 bytes in 27.2 s, about 8x per doubling.

Weaknesses & attack patterns

Weakness

CWE-407 · Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity in catalog → MITRE ↗

Attack patterns

CAPEC-130 · Excessive Allocation MITRE ↗

An attacker who can get an application to decode or encode a hostname they control, for example from a user-supplied URL or a redirect Location header, keeps one scheduler busy per call for seconds to hours depending on the label length. Enough concurrent calls exhaust the CPU of the VM.

Affected — Hex / idna Hex.pm ↗ Repository ↗

≥ 0.5.0 < 8.0.0 affected
every other version: unaffected
cpe cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:idna:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
version type semver
modules · source files · routines
modules idna · punycode
source files src/idna.erl · src/punycode.erl
routines idna:ulabel/1 · idna:decode/1 · idna:decode/2 · idna:to_unicode/1 · idna:from_ascii/1 · idna:alabel/1 · idna:encode/1 · idna:encode/2 · idna:to_ascii/1 · punycode:decode/1 · punycode:insert/4

Affected — GitHub / benoitc/erlang-idna Repository ↗

≥ c8caba6 < 7a465b6 affected
every other version: unaffected
cpe cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:idna:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
version type git
modules · source files · routines
modules idna · punycode
source files src/idna.erl · src/punycode.erl
routines idna:ulabel/1 · idna:decode/1 · idna:decode/2 · idna:to_unicode/1 · idna:from_ascii/1 · idna:alabel/1 · idna:encode/1 · idna:encode/2 · idna:to_ascii/1 · punycode:decode/1 · punycode:insert/4

Workarounds

Before passing a hostname to idna, reject any domain that contains a label longer than 63 octets. The DNS limits labels to that length, so legitimate names pass unchanged, and the decoder never runs on the crafted label. The check must run before every call that reaches idna:ulabel/1, including encode/1 and to_ascii/1, because alabel/1 decodes an ASCII xn-- label before checking its length.

References

Credits

Andrew Moore Finder Reporter
Martin Karrer Finder Remediation developer
Benoit Chesneau Remediation developer
Jonatan Männchen / EEF Coordinator

CVSS breakdown

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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