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Description
Uncaught Exception vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service via a client-selected legacy serializer on binary channel broadcasts.
When an application broadcasts {:binary, data} payloads on a channel topic, any client that connects without a vsn parameter, or with vsn=1.0.0, and joins that topic makes those broadcasts fail. Phoenix.Channel.Server.send/4 encodes each broadcast with every subscriber's own serializer inside the PubSub dispatch loop, calling fastlane!/1 with no rescue, and the negotiated Phoenix.Socket.V1.JSONSerializer raises Protocol.UndefinedError on a binary payload. Every binary broadcast on the topic then crashes the broadcasting process and skips every subscriber dispatched after the attacker. For broadcasts arriving from other nodes the loop runs in the PubSub adapter worker, whose repeated crashes restart the PubSub supervisor and empty the node's subscription registry while sockets stay connected.
This issue affects phoenix: from 1.5.7 before 1.5.16, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.18, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.25, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.17.
Technical analysis
1. Serializer selection. The socket picks its serializer from the client's vsn parameter. A missing vsn or vsn=1.0.0 selects Phoenix.Socket.V1.JSONSerializer, and Phoenix.Channel.Server registers it as the subscriber's fastlane metadata when the channel joins.
2. Shared dispatch. A broadcast runs Phoenix.Channel.Server.send/4 once per subscriber, inside the PubSub dispatch loop of the broadcasting process. It encodes the message with each subscriber's serializer through fastlane!/1 and has no rescue.
3. Crash. Phoenix.Socket.V1.JSONSerializer.fastlane!/1 JSON-encodes the payload, so a {:binary, data} tuple raises Protocol.UndefinedError. The exception aborts the loop: the broadcasting channel crashes (its client receives phx_error) and every subscriber after the attacker misses the message.
4. Cluster spread. For broadcasts from other nodes, the same loop runs in the Phoenix.PubSub.PG2 adapter worker. Each forwarded binary broadcast crashes it, and repeated crashes exceed the restart intensity and restart the PubSub supervisor, which empties the subscription registry while sockets stay connected. The report simulated this step locally by sending :forward_to_local to the worker.
Proof of concept
- Run a Phoenix endpoint with a channel whose
handle_in/3callsbroadcast(socket, "evt", {:binary, <<0, 1, 2, 3>>})on its topic. - As the attacker, open
/socket/websocket?vsn=1.0.0and join the topic with a V1 frame ({"topic": ..., "event": "phx_join", "payload": {}, "ref": ...}). - Connect several V2 clients (
vsn=2.0.0) and join the same topic. - From another V2 client on the topic, push the event that triggers the binary broadcast.
- The broadcaster receives
phx_error, the log showsProtocol.UndefinedErrorraised fromPhoenix.Socket.V1.JSONSerializer.fastlane!/1throughPhoenix.Channel.Server.send/4, and the V2 subscribers after the attacker receive nothing. Without the attacker, the same broadcast reaches every subscriber.
Weaknesses & attack patterns
Weakness
CWE-248
·
Uncaught Exception
in catalog →
MITRE ↗
Attack patterns
CAPEC-220
·
Client-Server Protocol Manipulation
MITRE ↗
An attacker who can join a topic makes every binary broadcast on it fail, crashing the broadcasting channel and starving the other subscribers. In clustered deployments, forwarded broadcasts crash the PubSub adapter worker until the node's subscriptions are lost.
Affected — Hex / phoenix Hex.pm ↗ Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Affected — GitHub / phoenixframework/phoenix Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Workarounds
Reject the V1 serializer by listing only the V2 serializer on each socket:
socket "/socket", MyAppWeb.UserSocket,
websocket: [serializer: [{Phoenix.Socket.V2.JSONSerializer, "~> 2.0.0"}]],
longpoll: [serializer: [{Phoenix.Socket.V2.JSONSerializer, "~> 2.0.0"}]]Clients that connect without a vsn parameter or with vsn=1.0.0 are then refused.
Configurations
The application must broadcast {:binary, data} payloads (through Phoenix.Channel.broadcast/3, broadcast_from/3, or Phoenix.Endpoint.broadcast/3) on a channel topic that an untrusted client can join. Applications that broadcast only map payloads are not affected.
References
Credits
CVSS breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Exploitability
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Attack Requirements
- Present
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
Vulnerable System
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Subsequent Systems
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None