Client-supplied URI scheme trusted without transport verification in bandit

Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated transport-state spoofing on plaintext HTTP connections.

'Elixir.Bandit.Pipeline':determine_scheme/2 in lib/bandit/pipeline.ex returns the client-supplied URI scheme verbatim, ignoring the transport's secure? flag. HTTP/1.1 absolute-form request targets (e.g. GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1) and the HTTP/2 :scheme pseudo-header are both attacker-controlled strings that flow through this function. Over a plaintext TCP connection, a client can declare https and Bandit will set conn.scheme = :https even though no TLS was negotiated.

Downstream Plug consumers that branch on conn.scheme are silently misled: Plug.SSL's already-secure branch skips its HTTP→HTTPS redirect, cookies emitted with secure: true are sent over plaintext, audit logs record requests as having arrived over HTTPS, and CSRF/SameSite gating may make incorrect decisions.

This issue affects bandit: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.0.

The vulnerable system must be accepting plaintext (non-TLS) HTTP connections, either directly or via h2c. Deployments that exclusively use TLS are not affected.