Am I affected?
Description
The fragment reassembly path in 'Elixir.Bandit.WebSocket.Connection':handle_frame/3 in lib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex appends every incoming Continuation{fin: false} frame's payload to a per-connection iolist with no cumulative size cap. The existing max_frame_size option only bounds individual frames; a peer that streams an unbounded number of continuation frames without ever setting fin=1 grows BEAM heap linearly until the OS or a supervisor kills the process.
Because the accumulation happens before WebSock.handle_in/2 is called, the application has no opportunity to interpose a size check. Phoenix Channels and LiveView both run over WebSock on Bandit, so a stock Phoenix application exposes this surface as soon as it accepts socket connections.
This issue affects bandit: from 0.5.0 before 1.11.0.
Weaknesses & attack patterns
Weakness
CWE-770
·
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
in catalog →
MITRE ↗
Attack patterns
CAPEC-130
·
Excessive Allocation
MITRE ↗
Affected — Hex / bandit Hex.pm ↗ Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Affected — GitHub / mtrudel/bandit Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Configurations
The application must accept WebSocket connections. Applications that expose no WebSocket endpoints are not affected.
References
GHSA-pf94-94m9-536p ↗
vendor-advisory
EEF-CVE-2026-42786 ↗
related
Credits
CVSS breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N