Am I affected?
Description
hackney_url:normalize/2 URL-decodes the host component after the URL has been parsed into a #hackney_url{} record. OTP's uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1 do not decode percent-escapes in the host, so a URL such as http://%31%32%37%2E%30%2E%30%2E%31/ is seen by a caller's allowlist validator with host %31%32%37%2E%30%2E%30%2E%31 (not an IP address), which passes the allowlist check. hackney's normalizer then decodes the host to 127.0.0.1 and opens a TCP connection to loopback. Because hackney:request/5 always calls hackney_url:normalize/2 with no opt-out, every request that takes a binary or list URL is affected. The same technique reaches cloud instance metadata services (169.254.169.254), RFC1918 networks, and any admin interface listening on localhost.
This issue affects hackney: from 0.13.0 before 4.0.1.
Weaknesses & attack patterns
Weakness
CWE-436
·
Interpretation Conflict
in catalog →
MITRE ↗
CWE-918
·
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
in catalog →
MITRE ↗
Attack patterns
CAPEC-664
·
Server Side Request Forgery
MITRE ↗
Affected — Hex / hackney Hex.pm ↗ Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Affected — GitHub / benoitc/hackney Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
References
GHSA-pj7v-xfvx-wmjq ↗
vendor-advisory
EEF-CVE-2026-47076 ↗
related
Credits
CVSS breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N