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Description

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-influenced binary input.

Guardian.Plug.Keys derives connection and session namespace keys by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. base_key/1 in lib/guardian/plug/keys.ex converts any binary into the atom :"guardian_<input>", and the derived helpers claims_key/1, resource_key/1, and token_key/1 create a second atom on top of that. key_from_other/1 likewise converts a regex-captured binary through String.to_atom/1. The public specs advertise String.t() as a valid argument, so passing a string is documented usage, and higher-level entry points such as Guardian.Plug.current_token(conn, key: key) thread the caller-supplied key straight into these functions.

String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that routes attacker-influenced data (a tenant identifier, header, or other request input) into a Guardian key therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node, taking down every application running on it.

This issue affects guardian: from 0.1.0 before 2.4.1.

Weaknesses & attack patterns

Weakness

CWE-770 · Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in catalog → MITRE ↗

Attack patterns

CAPEC-130 · Excessive Allocation MITRE ↗

Affected — Hex / guardian Hex.pm ↗ Repository ↗

≥ 0.1.0 < 2.4.1 affected
every other version: unaffected
cpe cpe:2.3:a:ueberauth:guardian:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
version type semver
modules · source files · routines
modules 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys'
source files lib/guardian/plug/keys.ex
routines 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys':base_key/1 · 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys':claims_key/1 · 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys':resource_key/1 · 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys':token_key/1 · 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys':key_from_other/1

Affected — GitHub / ueberauth/guardian Repository ↗

≥ 7126fa4 < 2952657 affected
every other version: unaffected
cpe cpe:2.3:a:ueberauth:guardian:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
version type git
modules · source files · routines
modules 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys'
source files lib/guardian/plug/keys.ex
routines 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys':base_key/1 · 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys':claims_key/1 · 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys':resource_key/1 · 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys':token_key/1 · 'Elixir.Guardian.Plug.Keys':key_from_other/1

Workarounds

Do not derive Guardian keys from untrusted input. Use a fixed, hardcoded set of namespace keys, or validate the value against a bounded allowlist of known keys, before passing it as the :key option.

Configurations

Only applications that derive a Guardian key (the conn/session namespace) from attacker-influenced data are exploitable. This is the case when a caller-supplied value such as a tenant identifier, request header, or other request input is passed as the :key option to entry points like Guardian.Plug.current_token/2. Applications that use a static namespace (the default :default key or hardcoded atoms) are not affected.

References

Credits

Peter Ullrich Finder
Yordis Prieto Remediation developer
Jonatan Männchen / EEF Analyst

CVSS breakdown

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H

Exploitability

Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
Present
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None

Vulnerable System

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Subsequent Systems

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High
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