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Description

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in ueberauth guardian allows an unauthenticated attacker to revoke a victim's session with a forged token.

Guardian.revoke/3 in lib/guardian.ex decodes the supplied token with peek/1, which performs no signature verification (it only base64-decodes the JWT header and payload). The resulting unverified claims are forwarded directly to the configured token module's revoke callback and the implementation's on_revoke callback, a state-mutating sink. The sibling operations refresh/2 and exchange/4 both call decode_and_verify first, so the signature is checked before anything acts on the claims; revoke/3 is the only state-mutating path that acts on claims without verifying the signature.

An attacker who knows or guesses a victim's identifying claim values (jti, sub) can forge a JWT carrying those claims, sign it with an arbitrary key, and submit it to any endpoint that funnels a caller-supplied token into Guardian.revoke/3 (the standard logout / session-revocation pattern). When the token module mutates state keyed by the claims (whitelist deletion or blacklist insertion, for example a GuardianDb-style store), the victim's legitimate session is evicted. This is an unauthenticated session-revocation denial of service; the attacker never needs the signing secret.

This issue affects guardian: from 1.0.0 before 2.4.1.

Weaknesses & attack patterns

Weakness

CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in catalog → MITRE ↗

Attack patterns

CAPEC-475 · Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation MITRE ↗

Affected — Hex / guardian Hex.pm ↗ Repository ↗

≥ 1.0.0 < 2.4.1 affected
every other version: unaffected
cpe cpe:2.3:a:ueberauth:guardian:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
version type semver
modules · source files · routines
modules 'Elixir.Guardian'
source files lib/guardian.ex
routines 'Elixir.Guardian':revoke/3

Affected — GitHub / ueberauth/guardian Repository ↗

≥ d652271 < 2bd7a8c affected
every other version: unaffected
cpe cpe:2.3:a:ueberauth:guardian:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
version type git
modules · source files · routines
modules 'Elixir.Guardian'
source files lib/guardian.ex
routines 'Elixir.Guardian':revoke/3

Workarounds

Verify the token before revoking it: call decode_and_verify (or a verify-without-expiry variant, so already-expired tokens remain revocable) on the caller-supplied token and pass only tokens whose signature validates into Guardian.revoke/3. Reject tokens with an invalid signature at the application boundary.

Configurations

The application must route a caller-supplied token into Guardian.revoke/3 (for example a logout or session-revocation endpoint) and use a token module whose revoke / on_revoke callback mutates state keyed by the token claims (a whitelist that deletes by jti or a blacklist that inserts by jti, such as a GuardianDb-style store). With the default no-op on_revoke callback, no session state is changed and the issue is not exploitable.

References

Credits

Peter Ullrich Finder
Yordis Prieto Remediation developer
Jonatan Männchen / EEF Analyst

CVSS breakdown

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitability

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
Present
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None

Vulnerable System

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Subsequent Systems

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
None
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