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Description
Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with single_use_token?, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token's validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.
Sign-in verifies the JWT with Jwt.verify/4 and revokes it only afterwards: AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation revokes in a Query.after_action callback, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange in an after_transaction hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3 writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Weaknesses & attack patterns
Weakness
CWE-367
·
Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
in catalog →
MITRE ↗
Attack patterns
CAPEC-29
·
Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions
MITRE ↗
Affected — Hex / ash_authentication Hex.pm ↗ Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Affected — GitHub / team-alembic/ash_authentication Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
References
Credits
CVSS breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N