Log injection via an unescaped password reset identity in AshAuthentication

Improper Output Neutralization for Logs vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge application log entries by submitting a password reset identity containing newlines or control characters.

AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.RequestPasswordReset.run/3 interpolates the identity argument, the email or username taken straight from the reset request, into its Logger.warning/1 heredocs without escaping, truncating or type-restricting it. The resource logged beside it is passed through inspect/1, which would have neutralized the value. A newline in the identity therefore ends the log record, and everything after it is written as a line of its own, so an attacker chooses the severity tag and the content of entries that appear to have come from the application.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.