Am I affected?
Description
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to obtain paid resources by resubmitting one settled on-chain transfer.
MPP.Methods.EVM.verify/2 accepts a transaction-hash credential and matches a transfer purely on token, to and amount (ERC-20) or to and value (native). It binds the proof neither to the challenge being verified nor to any record of prior use, and the generic MPP.Plug dedup store keys on challenge.id, which is regenerated for every 402 response. On a static-price route, a single historical transfer matching the charge therefore satisfies an unbounded number of later charges, including transfers an attacker can read off a public block explorer.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.3.0 before 0.6.3.
Weaknesses & attack patterns
Weakness
CWE-294
·
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
in catalog →
MITRE ↗
Attack patterns
CAPEC-60
·
Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
MITRE ↗
Affected — Hex / mpp Hex.pm ↗ Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Affected — GitHub / zenhive/mpp Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Workarounds
Price each challenge uniquely (per-challenge or single-use amounts) so that a historical transfer cannot match a later charge, and keep challenge expiry short to narrow the window in which any given transfer stays useful. Deployments that can use the Tempo method for on-chain payments get per-challenge attribution binding instead.
References
GHSA-vp5h-xh25-44wf ↗
vendor-advisory
EEF-CVE-2026-67581 ↗
related
Credits
CVSS breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N