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Description
AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3.
Weaknesses & attack patterns
Weakness
CWE-1220
·
Insufficient Granularity of Access Control
in catalog →
MITRE ↗
Attack patterns
CAPEC-1
·
Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
MITRE ↗
Affected — Hex / ash_ai Hex.pm ↗ Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Affected — GitHub / ash-project/ash_ai Repository ↗
modules · source files · routines
Configurations
Reachable only when an application exposes an AshAi read tool over a resource whose field policies restrict a field that the calling actor can still name as an aggregate (for example a public? true but field-policy-protected attribute).
References
Credits
CVSS breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N